Abstract
Current definitions and conceptualizations of sex, gender, and sexuality lack sufficient subtlety to adequately describe the full range of human sexuality. A taxonomy of gendered sexuality is developed which better defines terms relevant to human sexuality and more fully takes into account the interplay over time among sex, gender, and sexual fantasies, desires, practices of persons in intimate relationships at both the level of self identity and attribution by others. The proposed taxonomy starts with classifications based on the genetic sexes of persons in relationships and combines them with categorizations based on those persons’ social genders to arrive at classifications of gendered sexuality. The terminology used is drawn from everyday language. Examples are provided to illustrate the application of the taxonomy. The proposed taxonomy may be used for descriptive, diagnostic, or theoretical purposes.
THE PROBLEM
The problem of defining the sexuality of members of society has been vexing students of human behaviour since sexuality first began to be used as a basis for identity in the nineteenth century (Foucault, 1990; Weeks, 1989). Current models of sexuality are becoming increasingly complex but still remain neither flexible enough nor comprehensibly detailed enough to adequately describe the fantasies, desires, identities and practices of many members of society.
Current models have been built largely on the shoulders of the Kinsey group’s original bipolar continuum (Kinsey, Pomeroy & Martin, 1948). In the original Kinsey model of classification of human sexuality, a single continuum ran through seven stages ranging from a zero point of exclusively heterosexual through a mid point (three on the Kinsey scale) of equally heterosexual and homosexual to an end point (six on the Kinsey scale) of exclusively homosexual. Classifications in this system were based on overt behaviour and psychological variables. Kinsey himself, in anticipation of possible restrictive uses of his schema warned:
The world is not divided into sheep and goats. Not all things are black and white. It is a fundamental of taxonomy that nature rarely deals with discrete categories. Only the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separated pigeon holes. The living world is a continuum in each and every one of its aspects. The sooner we learn this concerning human sexual behavior the sooner we shall reach a sounder understanding of the realities of sex. (Kinsey, Pomeroy & Martin, 1948, p. 639)
In the late 1970s, Shively and De Cecco (1977) advanced the discussion by questioning the utility of a single continuum. They observed that sexual orientation might be made up of two types of preferences which might or might not have similar weights in the sexual orientation of any given individual. They called these components “physical preference” and “affectional preference.” They further suggested that each of these components might best be thought of as having two independent continua, one for heterosexuality and one for homosexuality. Shively and De Cecco also recognized that people’s behavioural and fantasy lives might also independently vary along these same continua (see also Bell & Weinberg, 1978 for a similar discussion). Thus Shively and De Cecco proposed a considerably more complex method of understanding sexuality than had been originally proposed by the Kinsey group.
Two years later, Cass (1979) added to the discourse by proposing a six stage theoretical model of homosexual identity formation. In her model, she pointed out several new dimensions to be considered. Her model recognized that homosexual identity is not necessarily based simplistically on actual sexual behaviour with persons of the same sex, on sexual fantasy about such relations, or on desire for such sexual relations. She also noted that there are often discrepancies among persons’ own identities, the information they present to others about their sexual orientations, and the assumptions made by others; a point which had also been well taken by Goffman (1963). She therefore opened the way for a still more contextually based understanding of sexual orientation.
Cass later went into some detail on the question of the need for a precise and agreed upon meaning for the term “identity” (Cass, 1983, 1984). She argued that although “self identity” may be influenced by meanings given to behavioural patterns, both by oneself and others, it is best seen as a cognitive construct in relation to a specific social category. She distinguished this self-identity from ”presented identity” and ”perceived identity.” Presented identity she defined as “that picture of self presented to others with regard to a specific socially defined category” (p. 111). Perceived identity was defined as “that image held by another about self with regard to a specific social category” (p. 112). Finally, Cass made the distinction between the terms “sexual identity” and “homosexual identity.” Sexual identity was used as a more general “overall conception of self as a sexual being” (p. 116) whereas homosexual identity referred specifically to an identification with the social category of homosexual.
DeCecco and Shively (1983/4) and Shively, Jones and De Cecco (1983/4) also dealt further with the question of sexology’s confused and conflicting definitions for sexual identity. Their point was that sexuality may be felt and expressed in such a variety of ways that heuristic models of human sexuality must not remain narrowly focussed on questions of genital contact. Instead, they argued in favour of a shift to more broadly defined questions of the social meanings and contexts within which relationships take place. Such a shift, they suggested, would allow for a more sociologically and historically sensitive rendering of this complex phenomenon.
In a contemporaneous article, Ross (1984) also decried sexology’s imprecise definition of the terms at the same time as his discussion of the issue illustrated some of that same confusion. Ross called for a model of sexual relationships founded on broad social meanings rather than biological definitions, stressing the point that people may engage in intimate relations for reasons not directly related to sex or gender status. In doing so, he used the terms “sex~~ and “gender” interchangeably and as synonymous with biological status. Thus, Ross too contributed to the muddy waters at the same time as he called for their clearing.
Noting that sexual identity is not a static thing in the lives of many people, Klein, Sepekoff and Wolf (1985) developed the Klein Sexual Orientation Grid (KSOG) as a way to test the theoretical proposition that sexual orientation is multi-variate and dynamic. In the KSOG, sexual orientation is described on the basis of seven variables. The KSOG uses a modified version of the Kinsey scale under three conditions of persons’ actual past, actual present, and personal ideal for their future sexuality. The seven variables suggested by Klein et al. as descriptive of sexual orientation were: sexual attraction, sexual behaviour, sexual fantasies, emotional preference, social preference, self-identification, and hetero/gay lifestyle (p. 39). Thus Klein et al. recognized several non-behavioural elements to sexual orientation as well as the possibility of its instability over time.
Coleman (1987) has argued strongly in favour of increasingly complex models of sexual orientation. In aid of this enterprise, he offered a model which synthesized many of the earlier methods of assessing and classifying sexual orientation. His model proposed nine dimensions of sexual orientations: (1) current relationship status defined in terms of variations on single versus coupled, sex of partner(s) not specified; (2) current sexual orientation identity, defined in terms of a Kinsey like scale; (3) desired future sexual orientation identity, similarly defined; (4) comfort with current sexual orientation identity; (5) physical identity, defined as thinking of oneself as having been born as a biological male or female; (6) gender identity, defined as thinking of oneself as physically female or male; (7) sex-role identity, defined as conforming to traditionally defined norms; (8) sexual orientation, defined in terms of the sex of the object of one’s sexual behaviour, fantasies and emotional attachments; and (9) a dimension probing changes in the last four dimensions over time. Coleman suggested that his model might be most useful as a diagnostic tool.
Grimm (1987) has also proposed a rather complex scheme for classifying gendered human relationships, both erotic and non-erotic. Grimm’s system starts from a male/female distinction. Each sex is further divided into categories which incorporate their body morphology and their gender identities, e.g., “woman with a vulva” or “woman with a penis” (p. 74-6). Within each of the four categories that result from this division, Grimm further classifies people by sexual orientation as either heterosexual or homosexual. Further distinctions are then made within each of these categories on the basis of gender of partner (i.e., masculine or feminine homo- or hetero- or bigenderous); complementarity, sameness or variety in sex of partner; and whether a relationship is erotic or non-erotic. Grimm’s system results in a total of 45 different possible combinations of two individuals in relationship to one another (p. 74-6). Grimm’s system takes several first steps toward recognizing some important distinctions in understanding human sexuality.
Money has, over the course of many years and countless publications, made many valuable contributions to the discourse on classificatory schemas in sexology. He summarized his work on sexual orientation in Gay, Straight, and In-Between: The Sexology of Erotic Orientation (1988). In that work, he argued that sexual behaviour and the composite of gender identity/role have both an evolutionary and an environmental basis. Relying on what he calls the “principle of developmental determinism” (p. 123), Money argued that although questions of human sexual orientation are tremendously complex, the mutability of individual persons’ sexuality is finite. Money argued that sexual orientation is built through an interaction between “nature/critical period/nurture” (p. 87) in which biological predispositions must be environmentally activated during specific sensitive periods in the developmental process and then reinforced over a period of time. Once established in such a way, Money argued, sexual orientation “may become irreversible and immutable” (p. 87). Thus Money argued in favour of a classificatory schema which recognizes both nature and nurture, constancy and change.
The classificatory schema which Money (1988) proposed was based on the concept of gender crosscoding or transposition. He took for his starting point the assumption that exclusive heterosexuality constitutes the most advantageous gender coding from an evolutionary point of view. Variations were classified on the basis of degree of transposition from exclusive heterosexuality. They ranged through three categories of “partial limited” transposition, “partial unlimited” transposition, and “total” transposition; and through two temporal categories, measured dichotomously as either “continuous or constant” or “episodic or alternating” (p. 85). From this basic schema Money went on to develop an extremely complex Graeco-Latinate system of nomenclature for many of the myriad variations in sexual orientation that he has been exposed to in his extensive career.
A competing theoretical formulation of gender transpositions, “The Periodic Table Model of Gender Transpositions” has been proposed by Pillard and Weinrich (1987) and Weinrich (1988). Their theory is basically a sociobiological one in which they claimed that human bodies and brains may be transposed from the evolutionary norm through the action of hormonal fluctuations at critical periods in human development both before and after birth.
Pillard and Weinrich (1987) argued that transpositions may occur in four different ways and gave examples of kinds of sexuality which might typify each quadrant of their periodic chart. In one quadrant they placed “unmasculinized and defeminized” people who they described as “fairly asexual” such as is found among many male-to-female transsexuals and “certain lesbians” (p. 436-8). In another quadrant they placed “masculinized and defeminized” people who they described synonymously with stereotypical heterosexual male behaviour (p. 435). Likewise, they typified third quadrant people as “unmasculinized and undefeminized” having the characteristics of stereotypical heterosexual females (p. 435). They placed “most homosexual men and many lesbian women” in the final quadrant which they characterized as “masculinized and undefeminized” (p. 438). Not surprisingly, their work has been the subject of some debate. Although acclaimed by some, others have accused them of making “untrue assumptions” and then simplifying their data to make them fit those assumptions (Coleman, Gooren & Ross, 1989, p. 528).
Several authors have turned their attention to the question of the classification of the sexual orientations of gender dysphoric people. The main concern in such cases has been whether classifications should be on the basis of sex, usually defined in terms of genetic sex regardless of surgical status, or on the basis of gender presentation. Blanchard, Clemmensen and Steiner (1987) and Blanchard (1989) have argued in favour of a system based on genetic sex. According to such a system, gender dysphoric persons would be classified as homosexual when attracted to persons of the same genetic sex as themselves and non-homosexual persons would be sub-divided into heterosexual, bisexual, and analloerotic (which Blanchard defined as “unattracted to male or female partners, but not necessarily devoid of sexual drives or activities” p. 315). The DSM-IV Subcommittee on Gender Dysphorias (Bradley et al., 1991) has suggested a five category system which would be more sensitive to the needs of gender dysphoric persons. Their system would involve sub-types which specify only the sex of the persons one is attracted to, i.e., attracted to females, to males, to both, to neither, and unspecified. Such a system avoids altogether the question of the sex or gender of gender dysphoric persons in those cases where the object of attraction is not also a gender dysphoric person.
A series of papers released between 1988 and 1992 once again questioned the utility of systems which classify sexuality on the basis of genetics and genitalia (Bockting & Coleman, 1991; Coleman & Bockting, 1988; Coleman, Bockting & Gooren, 1992 unpublished manuscript). Each of these papers is, at least partially, concerned with the conceptual issues raised by the existence of female-to-male transsexuals who identify themselves and live as gay men. The point is repeatedly made that present classificatory systems are unable to adequately capture the subjective experience of such persons. Currently used systems of classification such as the DSM Ill-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) tend to classify such people as heterosexual on the basis of the genetic sexes of the persons involved whereas the people themselves see themselves, and function credibly, as gay men. In response to this dilemma Coleman and Bockting (1988) suggested that “an assessment device that takes into account a person’s gender identity or social sex-role would enhance our ability to describe an individual’s sexual orientation” (p. 79). Bockting and Coleman (1991, p. 420) and Coleman, Bockting and Gooren (1992, p. 17) reiterate this point. It is from this point that I begin to elaborate my classificatory system which offers a way out of this seeming conundrum.
Building on these important issues raised by my predecessors, I offer a classificatory scheme which focuses on individuals in relationships, taking into account several of the levels on which it has been suggested sexuality might function. I make no claim to be exhaustive in this endeavor, merely to suggest some further refinements to the work begun by others.
I have chosen to illustrate some of the problems which I will be addressing by asking the reader to consider a number of persons whom I have met in the course of my field research on the social construction of gender in North American society. 1 All of these people exist and have sexualities and identities which are challenging to popular everyday understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality. I have chosen these relationships because their unusualness brings into sharp relief some of the problems with current conceptualizations of sex, gender, and sexuality (Bockting & Coleman, 1991; Coleman & Bockting, 1988; Coleman, Bockting & Gooren, 1992 unpublished manuscript; Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1974). Nonetheless, this taxonomy should also prove useful in helping to clarify considerations of sex, gender, and sexuality for any member of society. The method developed in this consideration can be so widely applied because the behaviours of few people conform perfectly to normative models of sex, gender, or sexuality. Furthermore, when the discussion shifts from the realm of behaviour to that of fantasy and desire, the variety displayed by humanity is enormous and certainly can easily match, or even exceed, the range of situations used for illustrative purposes in this essay.
The following seven relationships, and some of the questions which they engender, will be used to develop this taxonomy:
1. A male-to-female transsexual dates a male cross-dresser. Is their relationship lesbian, gay, heterosexual?
2. A female-to-male transsexual is legally married to a male-to-female transsexual. Which one is the heterosexual man?
3. A female-to-male transsexual is legally married to a normative genetic woman. Are they lesbian or heterosexual?
4. A female-to-male transsexual lives as a gay man. Are the people in these relationships gay or heterosexual?
5. A female part-time cross-dresser is in a romantic/sexual relationship with a male full-time cross-dresser. Is their relationship homosexual or heterosexual?
6. A masculine woman is occasionally mistaken for a man when out in public with her female lover. Are they still lesbian when one is passing as a man?
7. A masculine woman is in a long-term monogamous relationship with a still more masculine man. Are they in a homoerotic relationship?
Before entering into my main task of providing a better way of conceptualizing sexuality, it is necessary to define the central terms to be used in this discussion. I have chosen, wherever possible, to use language which is already in common usage. I have done so in an effort to avoid unnecessary complication of an already very complex field. I have also chosen to use the vernacular wherever possible so as to make this system accessible to as wide a range of people as possible. I have done this in the hopes that non-profession and non-academic groups and individuals might also be able to make use of this tool in clarifying their own experiences of sexuality.
When I use the word “sex” I refer only to the physiological status of persons as either female or male. There have been many criteria used to define biological sex status. Shively and De Cecco (1977) have reported that all of the following have been used: chromosomal configuration, gonads, internal reproductive structures, external genitalia, hormonal secretions, sex assigned at birth, and psychological sex-gender identity (p. 41-2). In this discussion I will use genetic sex as the determining factor while recognizing that, in cases of some cross-gendered persons, body morphology may vary significantly from that which might usually be expected for a person of a particular genetic sex.
When I use the word “gender” I refer only to the social status of a person as women (girls) or men (boys). This distinction is especially important in cases of cross-gendered individuals whose social persona (or body morphology) may be entirely different from that which their genetic sex would typically suggest.
When I use the term “gender roles,” I refer to those culturally defined and social prescribed behaviours and beliefs which characterize people as varying degrees of feminine or masculine. Whatever gender role representations dominate in a particular person’s interpersonal interactions serve as major indicators of gender status in social situations (Devor, 1987). Cass’s (1983/4) “presented identity” would function similarly to what I call gender roles but gender roles would encompass more of an intrapsychic component than the concept of presented identity implies.
When I use the word “sexuality” I refer to the pattern of sexual fantasy, desire, and/or practice of persons. I recognize that fantasy with no desire for actual sexual practice, desire for actual practice and actual sexual practice often are not congruent or consistent either across a person’s lifetime of experience or within particular temporal periods of individuals’ lives. The model that I am developing here is a tool which could be used to categorize sexuality at any of these levels or to make comparisons among them.
I use the terms “sexual fantasy” and “sexual desire” to refer to ones’ visions of the person(s) and activities which they find sexually stimulating. This might include anything from romance to genital contact. I make a distinction here between sexual desires and sexual fantasies. I use the term “sexual fantasies” to refer to those images (generated from whatever source) which persons find sexually stimulating but have no desire to actually engage in personally. I use the term “sexual desires” to refer to those activities and persons that one desires to have actual sexual contact with at some time in the future.
When I use the term “sexual practice” I refer to the sexual activities that persons actually engage in as differentiated from those which might be fantasized or desired but not realized. In the real world of everyday people there may, or may not, be considerable overlap between sexual practice and desire or fantasy. For instance, masturbation typically involves fantasy or desire of sexual contact with others accompanied by solitary practice. By the same token, many sexual practices engaged in with others are accompanied by sexual fantasies or desires for different practices or partners from what is actually transpiring at a given moment.
When I use the term “identity” I refer to a person’s acceptance of a sex, gender or sexual categorization as descriptive of themselves. My usage, in this case, parallels that of Cass’s (1983/4) “self-identity.” When I use the term “attribution” I refer to the categorizations made by others as descriptive of a person’s sex, gender or sexuality. My use of attribution would therefore be analogous to what Cass (1983/4) called “perceived identity.”
Currently, the most commonly used sex categorizations are female and male, and the most commonly used gender categorizations are woman or girl and man or boy. The currently most commonly used sexual categorizations are heterosexual or straight, homosexual or gay or lesbian, and bisexual. The schema I am developing here allows for separate categorizations on the basis of fantasy, desire, and practice where such differentiations are appropriate. Furthermore, this schema also permits recognition of the possibility of differences between persons’ own identities and the attributions made by others on each of these levels of analysis. I start from these simple dichotomies because they are common in everyday usage. It is my hope that by problematizing these dichotomies their conceptual stranglehold on the social meaning of sexuality can be weakened. It is my intention to help to develop a workable and understandable descriptive and analytic language which enables people and fosters the diversity that exists among us. The taxonomic tools I offer here are only meant to be a beginning.
A SOCIAL CONTEXT FOR GENDERED SEXUALITY
In North American society, the norms for sex, gender and sexuality are embodied in an ideological structure which I refer to as the culture’s dominant gender schema (Bern, 1981, 1983; Devor, 1987, 1989). This dominant gender schema, in its present form, represents the patriarchal part of the ideological underpinnings of late 20th century patriarchal capitalism in North America. The dominant gender schema is a cognitive filter which teaches members of society to recognize and understand only certain forms of behaviour as gendered. As such, it functions as an overarching “cultural scenario” (Gagnon, 1990, p. 9). That scenario provides instructions to members of society about what constitutes culturally intelligible meanings for attitudes, behaviours, beliefs, roles, identities, attributions, and a host of other factors, which comprise dominant conceptualizations of sex, gender and sexuality.
The dominant gender schema rests on an essentialist biological determinism wherein biological sex is presumed to give rise to gendered styles of social behaviours and attitudes. Additionally, the ideology of the dominant gender schema posits that categories of biological sex (male/female), social gender (man/woman), and sexuality (heterosexual/homosexual), are each discrete, dichotomous and permanent under most circumstances. Finally, the connection between sex and gender is conceptualized as so congruent as to permit the terms sex and gender to be commonly used as interchangeable (Money, 1988, p. 52). Sexuality, within the ideological framework of the dominant gender schema, is posited as a particular type of gendered behaviour which results from persons’ biological sex status (Dorner, 1980; Pillard & Weinrich, 1987; Weinrich, 1988).
The ideology of the dominant gender schema defines which cognitive structures are legitimate for members of society to use when making sense of their experiences. Members of society are thus socialized to accept the premises of the dominant gender schema as true and correct and to see the dominant gender schema as the one and only legitimate way of conceptualizing sex, gender, and sexuality. In this way, the power of the dominant gender schema becomes such that it is virtually impossible to socially be a person without also being a gendered person. Gender thus becomes a prerequisite to identity and to all social intercourse: intrapersonally, interpersonally, and within the structures of social institutions (Gagnon, 1990). Thus, as a result of their socialization experiences, members of society share a common recognition of dominant gender practices and a language which allows them to effectively engage in social discourse about sex, gender, and sexuality. The apparent naturalness and universality of this gendered social language seems to reinforce the power and the hegemony of the dominant gender schema, of the gendered basis of social institutions, and of individual social actors’ personalized understandings of gender.
Individual social actors understand themselves as members of society by virtue of being able to see themselves in relationship to others whom they use as referents. Thus individuals internalize the norms of society as their “generalized others” (Mead, 1962) against whom they measure their behaviour to ensure that it is sufficiently conforming so as to avoid stigmatization (Goffman, 1963). Each person therefore attempts to conform to their personal idiosyncratic understanding of the dominant gender schema, which I call their “personal gender schema” (Devor, 1989), and which is analogous to what Gagnon refers to as the more conscious portion of an “intrapsychic script” (1990, p. 10). In this way members of society acquire their “gender roles.”
The actual gendered behavioural styles for members of each sex/gender class vary with such factors as age, race, socioeconomic class, ethnicity, physical or mental ability, and by membership in sexually defined minority groups. Nonetheless, the gender norms of each social sub-grouping must at least roughly conform to the main premises of the dominant gender schema. Social sub-grouping may establish social norms at odds with the society of which they are a part. To do so is to challenge the hegemony of the dominant social order. Such challenges are, of course, routinely undertaken, but those who have attempted to redirect the dominant gender schema have most often found their efforts quashed, or co-opted and absorbed. Only when changes involve massive numbers of people of extreme persistence may a gradual shift in some aspect of the seemingly monolithic dominant gender schema be effected.
It is my contention that, in current practice, sex, gender, and sexuality are conceptually linked in a systematic way such that all sexuality is gendered and such that all gender has sexualized elements. Gender is thus, in part, a product of the social meanings given to biological sex status, sexual desire, sexual practice, sexual identity and sexual attributions. Similarly, sexuality is behaviour of sexed and gendered people and as such cannot exist independently of the sexes and genders of the persons involved (Mackinnon, 1982, 1983). I therefore maintain that it is necessary to think in terms of a “gendered sexuality” which takes into account sex, gender, and sexuality as a collectivity rather than studying sexuality as a characteristic separate from either sex or gender.
Sexuality is a pivotal part of the interplay between sex, gender, and gender roles. I claim that this is the case because of the widely accepted portrayal of sexuality as biologically driven, intrinsically tied to sex and, by inference, to gender. As such, the styles and direction of sexual fantasies, desires, and practices have the power to reinforce, threaten, or define the goodness of fit between gender and sex. I would further argue that sexuality is central to gender roles, delimiting and propelling more mundane aspects of gender roles, pressing them into service of the ultimate validation of the physical self as an appropriately sexed and gendered human being. Sexuality and the sexual identities which result from the interplay of gender and sexual fantasies, desires and practices thus become pieces of the puzzle that comprises sex and gender.
I propose that the concept of “gendered sexuality” be used to refer to the interactions of its three aspects of sex, gender, and sexuality. In describing gendered sexuality I reserve the terms “heterosexual” and “homosexual” to refer to the sexes of persons involved in particular sexual patterns of fantasy, desire, or practice. Bearing in mind that I conceptually separate sex and gender, I reserve the terms “straight” and “lesbian” or “gay” to refer to the genders of persons involved in similar sexual patterns of fantasy, desire, or practice. In addition, I specifically use “female” and “male” to refer only to the biological sex statuses of persons. By contrast, I use the words “woman” and “man” to mean the social genders of individuals regardless of their genetic sex statuses. Thus the following gendered sexualities become the main building blocks of the taxonomy I am developing: female and male heterosexual, or female and male homosexual, to refer to the sexes of individuals; straight woman and straight man, or lesbian woman and gay man, to refer to the genders of the people in sexual relationships.
As bisexuality has not had the benefit of the level of social discourse accorded to homosexuality or heterosexuality (De Cecco & Shively, 1984; Paul, 1984, 1985), I know of no vernacular term analogous to the way I have used gay, lesbian and straight to refer to the genders of persons’ sexualities. Perhaps bisexuality could be used to refer to the sexes of the persons involved while some term such as “bi” might be used to refer to the genders of the persons involved in such relationships. Because of these difficulties, and for purposes of simplicity in this first presentation of this taxonomy, throughout the remainder of this paper I will restrict my examples to those which involve heterosexual/straight or homosexual/lesbian/gay relationships. The basic building blocks of the taxonomy presented here could readily enough be used to incorporate bisexuality, and many other variations, into this system.
The terminology suggested here may be somewhat confusing because the dominant gender schema has constrained popular conceptualization of sexuality so that the form and content of sexual fantasies, desires and activities are generally thought of as more contingent on biological sex than on social gender. In other words, we normally believe that knowledge of the biological sexes of two people involved in sexual interaction is sufficient to categorize both their genders and their sexualities. I am arguing here that, although genetic sex must be a consideration in the classification of sexuality, social gender plays a more pivotal role in how we understand sexuality in ourselves and in others (Coleman, 1987).
Under most circumstances, gendered sexuality, and the premises of the dominant gender schema, remain unproblematic. It is only when social actors violate social norms that the very existence and limitations of those norms are brought into sharp relief (Garfinkel, 1967). Thus gendered social order is exerted through the socialization of members of society to see themselves, and others, as socially legitimate only when they can construe their existence as sensible within the logic of the dominant gender schema as they know it. Gender roles, which form the basis of the normative rules for gendered sexuality, serve as the communication devices of gendered social discourse. Gender roles enable members of society to present themselves, and recognize others, as they wish to be seen.
Gender roles are not uniquely defined but rather have multiple interpretations possible within different contexts. Therefore the effectiveness of the gender role elements employed by social actors in given situations are dependent upon the context in which the negotiation of meaning takes place. Actions which would seem masculine in one context may seem quite feminine in another by contrast to the still more masculine conduct of other actors. It is therefore impossible to simply say that certain behaviours, objects, opinions, or props are reliable indicators of femininity or masculinity. Rather, each must be recognizable in a vast array of circumstances under which every conceivable combination of gender role behaviour, age, sex, race, class, ethnicity, level of mental or physical ability, and type of sexuality can function to confuse the meanings of actions.
I would argue that rather than defining gender roles through specific actions, opinions, objects, or props the best approach would be to look at femininity and masculinity as meanings made recognizable on the basis of relational styles of self-presentation. In this view, masculinity and femininity become relational styles which are distinguishable under a wide variety of cultural contexts and specific interpersonal circumstances.
In everyday life, physical characteristics, clothing and other gender props are taken as indicators of the gender role relational styles to be expected from those who use them to identify themselves. When clothing and other cues do not correspond well with relational styles cues, relational style cues take precedence as indicators of gender, and sex is assumed to correspond with gender as prescribed by the dominant gender schema. When sex is known to differ from the interpretation normally given to a particular gender role presentation, the biologism of the dominant gender schema will dictate that sex is taken as the final arbiter of gender. Thus, gender role cues are used in everyday life as primary indicators of gender and, by implication of sex, unless sex is known to differ from expected gender.
The gender roles of femininity and masculinity share common relational dilemmas and can each be practiced to varying degrees by persons of any sex or gender status. Each gender status claim is a simplification of the complexity inherent in the immense diversity of human nature. Each can also be a response to the threat of social bareness of self. As such, gender roles provide a socially acceptable way to claim membership in a desired social grouping and a way to protect one’s self from the dangers inherent in public exposure of imperfect conformity to the demands of the dominant gender schema. Obviously, gender roles are not the only way to achieve these ends—all social roles can be seen in a similar light.
The central relational themes of masculinity are to maintain distance and to control, dominate or subsume others. Masculinity is therefore characterized by isolation and separation of the self from others (Chodorow, 1978; Kaufman, 1987; Pleck, 1981). The feminine gender role is characterized by the pursuit of communion through the submission of the self to the needs of others and attempts to foster a sense of ingroup inclusiveness (Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982). Feminine selflessness can thus provide the basis for the development of strong community and family ties or can lead to self-destructiveness.
These gendered behaviour patterns can be, and routinely are, practiced by persons of any sex or gender status. Although individual persons may not conform precisely to the specific behaviour patterns commonly associated with their sex, the overall contextual impacts of their relational styles serve to gender them as women and men.
TOWARD A TAXONOMY OF GENDERED SEXUALITY
Within the framework of the dominant gender schema, sexuality is posited as a more intrinsic part of the self than most other aspects of gender. This is because sexuality is conceptualized within the dominant gender schema as more physically driven and less self-consciously motivated behaviour than most other personality characteristics. The dominant gender schema therefore ideologically links sex both to gender and to sexuality through a purportedly biologically controlled connection. The dominant gender schema posits that the biological facts of sex determine the gender that a person will be, as well as the sex/gender of the persons they will find sexually attractive, and that heterosexuality is the biologically based norm (Dorner, 1980; Money, 1988; Pillard & Weinrich, 1987; Weinrich, 1988). Gender roles, according to this schema, follow “naturally” from gender as mediated through culture (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1. Sexuality in the Dominant Gender Schema
This dominant gender schema serves an ideological function in society. It posits a particular set of gendered social relations which serve to reinforce the interests and power of certain segments of society over those of others. Resistance to, and contradictions in the tenets of the dominant gender schema are widespread and can be seen demonstrated in the tremendous variance in gender, sexuality, and medically altered sex characteristics which exist throughout society. The limited sex, gender, and sexual variance given credibility by the dominant gender schema suppresses recognition of the full range of actual variance which does exist. I propose here an alternative conceptualization of gender and sexuality which can potentially take into account more of that variance.
The argument has been made that sex and gender should be conceptually separated and viewed as two variables rather than one, with sex representing biological status and gender representing social persona (de Beauvoir, 1974; Devor, 1989; Kessler & McKenna, 1978; Money & Ehrhardt, 1972; Unger, 1979). In contrast to the propositions of the dominant gender schema, I suggest here that sexuality is, in practice, socially more firmly linked with gender, than with sex, in several ways. Firstly, the gendered relational styles of femininity and masculinity incline persons to prefer sexual practices and partners whose relational styles are gender schematically compatible with their own (i.e., dichotomously opposite). I therefore contend that the majority of persons are sexually attracted to, and sexually attractive to, others who allow them to play out their preferred gender role relational styles, regardless of the biological sex statuses of those persons. In this sense, sexuality could be more accurately viewed as heterogenderal/homogenderal rather than as heterosexual/homosexual (Grimm, 1987; Pauly, 1974) in terms of what combination of relational styles (i.e., communion or distance) are preferred by the persons involved. Thus, I suggest the separation of sexuality, as described as a function of the sexes of the persons involved, from sexuality as described on the basis of the genders of the persons involved. In most instances this distinction will seem redundant. The necessity of this approach becomes clear when it is applied to other than normative relations.
Secondly, it is my contention that members of society judge sexual compatibility on the basis of the prescriptions and proscriptions of the current dominant gender schema as they have internalized them in their personal gender schemas. Thus, although sexual attractions may be felt on the basis of gender role relational styles rather than on the basis of actual gender statuses or sex statuses, the sexual desires of most members of society are trained by social pressures to conform to dominant gender schema norms (Gagnon, 1990; Simon & Gagnon, 1973). Therefore the vast majority of persons only recognize and act upon sexual desires which are both heterogenderal and heterosexual, while smaller numbers of social actors conform to less widely accepted patterns of homosexuality! homogenderality or bisexuality/bigenderality. Thus, the dominant gender schema curtails our ability to imagine most other forms of sexuality and limits our ability to understand and accept much of what people actually do experience, desire, or fantasize.
In Figure 2 I have summarized the basics of the taxonomy I am proposing. This taxonomy is offered for descriptive and theoretical purposes only. I in no way mean to imply that any person can, or should be, in any way confined by the classification system presented here. Human beings, and the relationships they engage in, are complex and constantly changing (Blumstein & Schwartz, 1990; Cass, 1990; Lever, Kanouse, Rogers, Carson & Hertz, 1992). Hence the categorizations arrived at through this taxonomy may be applicable only for moments, or for many years, depending on the motility of the practices, desires, and/or fantasies involved.
FIGURE 2. Basic Classification Method
| Relationship | Sex | Sex X Sex | Gender | Gender X Gender | Gendered Sexuality |
| Sex and Gender of Person A Sex and Gender of Person B |
Female or Male |
Female Het. Male Het. Female Homo. Male Homo. |
Woman or Man |
Straight Woman Straight Man Lesbian Woman Gay Man |
Sex X Sex plus Gender X Gender |
| A) Female WomanB) Male Man | FemaleMale | Female Het.Male Het. | WomanMan | Straight WomanStraight Man | Female Het. Straight Woman Male Het. Straight Man |
| A) Female WomanB) Female Woman | FemaleFemale | Female Homo.Female Homo. | WomanWoman | Lesbian WomanLesbian Woman | Female Homo. Lesbian Woman Female Homo. Lesbian Woman |
| A) Male ManB) Male Man | MaleMale | Male Homo.Male Homo. | ManMan | Gay ManGay Man | Male Homo. Gay Man Male Homo. Gay Man |
| A) Male Cross-dresserB) Female Woman |
MaleFemale | Male Het.Female Het. | WomanWoman | Lesbian WomanLesbian Woman | Male Het. Cross-dresser Lesbian Woman Female Het. Lesbian Woman |
The taxonomy sketched here may be used on several levels. It may be used as a descriptive, diagnostic or theoretical tool. It may be used to explore fantasies, desires and/or practices. It may be used by persons to categorize their own gendered sexuality and thus aid in clarifying their sexual identities. It may also be used by persons who wish to categorize the gendered sexuality of others, thus it may be used as an aid in the making of sexual attributions. There is, of course, no basis for assuming that any of these various levels of usage should necessarily arrive at the same categorizations for given individuals or relationships.
In Figure 2 each social actor may be identified on the basis of a genetic sex of female or male, and a social gender of woman or man. When a person sexually interacts with, desires, or fantasizes about another person, both the sexes and the genders of the persons involved must be accounted for in arriving at a gendered sexuality classification. Thus for each person there will be (1) a classification of female or male, heterosexual or homosexual on the basis of the sexes of the persons involved; (2) a classification of gay or straight man or lesbian or straight woman on the basis of the genders of the persons involved; and (3) a gendered sexuality classification which is the summation of (1) and (2).
Figure 2 illustrates this method of classification for the most common classifications of female heterosexual straight woman, male heterosexual straight man, female homosexual lesbian woman, and male homosexual gay man. The situation becomes more complex when persons claim genders which are inconsistent with normative perspectives on gender. Figure 3 summarizes the most basic combinations of sex, gender, and gendered sexuality.
FIGURE 3. A Basic Taxonomy of Gendered Sexuality
Figure 4 illustrates the application of this taxonomy to the seven examples cited earlier in this paper. In many of these examples a further element must be included in the gendered sexuality classification in order to account for seemingly anomalous features in their gendered sexuality. Where persons are transsexuals or cross-dressers this must be noted. Examples 1-5 illustrate some variations on this theme. Similarly, when social actors’ gender displays vary sufficiently from normative expectations to evoke misattributions, or simply to be noted as unusual, this too must somehow be designated. Examples 6 and 7 show how this can be done.
FIGURE 4. Some Non-Normative Applications of a Taxonomy of Gendered Sexuality
Example 1 involves a male-to-female transsexual dating a male cross-dresser. In this example, the male-to-female transsexual and the male cross-dresser she 2dates would both be described as male homosexual, lesbian women. They would be male homosexualsbecause they are both genetically males; they are designated as lesbian women because they are both socially functioning in the gender of woman. Their transsexuality or cross-dressing must also be noted so as to clarify how it is that the sexes and genders of each individual do not align as per normative expectations. One would be described as a male-to-female transsexual, male heterosexual, lesbian woman. The other would be classified as a male homosexual crossdresser, lesbian woman.
Example 2 involves a female-to-male transsexual married to a male-to-female transsexual. Both of these people would be termed as heterosexual and straight. The increased accuracy of this system of classification lies in the clarification of the conceptual distinction between sex and gender and the accurate capturing of both biological and social realities. The female-to-male transsexual in this couple would be described as a female-to-male transsexual, female heterosexual, straight man while the male-to-female transsexual would be described as a male-to-female transsexual, male heterosexual, straight woman. They would both be designated as heterosexuals because their genetic sexes are not the same as one another. They are both straight because they also differ from one another in gender: the female-to-male transsexual is a man, the male-to-female transsexual is a woman. The transsexual designations are necessary in order to explain the nature of the differences between their sexuality as classified by sex and their sexuality as classified by gender.
In example 3, a female-to-male transsexual is married to a normative genetically female woman. The transsexual would be described as female-to-male transsexual, female homosexual, straight man and his wife would be described as female homosexual, straight woman. They are both female homosexuals because they are both female by sex. They are both straight because they differ by gender. The female-to-male transsexual designation explains how it is that the man in this example is female and why the woman is simultaneously homosexual and straight.
In example 4, a female-to-male transsexual is living as a gay man. Assuming that his partners are normative genetically male gay men, he would be described as a female-to-male transsexual, female heterosexual, gay man. His partners would be described as male heterosexual gay men. In this case the sexes of the persons are different because the transsexual is still genetically female. Therefore both partners are heterosexual, but they are also both men by gender, so they are both gay men. The female-to-male transsexual designation explains why these gay men are also heterosexual.
Example 5 introduces other complications. In this case, a part-time female cross-dresser and a full-time male cross-dresser are in a relationship with one another. In this example, the female cross-dresser is at all times female while the male cross-dresser remains at all times male. Thus they are both, at all times, heterosexual. But the part-time female cross-dresser goes back and forth between genders while the full-time male cross-dresser always remains a woman by gender. Thus the gendered part of their gendered sexuality changes between straight and lesbian as a reflection of the gender mobility of the female part-time cross-dresser.
If the female is cross-dressed, socially functioning as a man, he would be classified as a female heterosexual cross-dresser, straight man; when presenting as a woman, she would be a female heterosexual, lesbian woman. The male cross-dresser in this couple always remains as a woman by gender. The final gendered term in her classification would depend on whether her partner was being a man or a woman. She would be classified as a male heterosexual cross-dresser, straight woman when her partner was passing as a man, and a male heterosexual cross-dresser, lesbian woman when her partner was passing as a woman.
These examples illustrate that in this system of classification genetic sex is considered a constant. Transsexual designations are used to take into account the physical changes that are accomplished through hormonal and surgical techniques. Gendered sexuality classifications on the basis of the sexes of the persons involved (heterosexual, homosexual) therefore do not change. Gendered sexuality designations on the basis of gender (lesbian, gay, straight) are, on the other hand, effected when transsexualism or cross-dressing are involved. Thus, whenever a classification contains a sex element which does not normatively align with a gender element, transsexualism or crossdressing must be involved and must be specified in some manner.
Example 6 involves a variation other than transsexualism or cross-dressing: a masculine woman who unintentionally finds herself mistaken for a man when out in public with her woman lover. Two perspectives must be accounted for here, that of self-identity and that of attributions made by others. Regardless of the masculine woman’s being mistaken for a man, both are female homosexual lesbian women in their own identities. But to the others who have mistaken the masculine woman for a man she would be assumed to be a straight man out with his straight woman lover. Both are female homosexual lesbian women by both identity and attribution when the masculine woman is not mistaken for a man, but how do others determine that she and her lover are lesbian women when the masculine woman’s gender identity is correctly perceived?
Sex, gender, and sexual attributions are made by others on the basis of observable gender role characteristics. In the case of a masculine woman, her pronounced masculinity may, in some instances, cause her to be seen by others as a man out with his woman lover. When that happens she will be attributed by others with being a straight man. Similarly, by association, her lover, whose gender is unambiguous, will be attributed with being a straight woman. Making use of the common stereotypes of the dominant gender schema, the “man” will be assumed to be male as the woman will be assumed to be female. Thus gendered sexuality attributions inconsistent with their identities will be made. Such misattributions are not uncommon (Devor, 1989).
When her gender role display is less emphatically masculine, or her femininity is more in evidence, or the people observing her are able to make more sophisticated appraisals of her gender role cues, she will be attributed with lesbian status on the basis of the popular belief that masculine women are lesbian women. Her woman lover will be attributed with lesbian status simply as a result of being seen to be intimate with a woman assumed to be lesbian.
While it is common in sexually based relationships for one partner to be noticeably more masculine or feminine than the other, the gender role display of the more masculine woman in example 6 varies enough from the norm for women that her gender is sometimes misattributed by others. I use the term “gender blenders” to describe people whose self-identities are unambiguous but who frequently experience gender misattributions (Devor, 1989). I use the terms “butch” and “femme,” borrowed from lesbian/gay vernacular, to refer to a less extreme masculinity and femininity that is still beyond what is normative for either women or men. Emphatic masculinity in either women or men would result in their being labeled as “butch” while pronounced femininity in either women or men would result in their being labeled as “femme.” What is considered “emphatic” or “pronounced” is, of course, very much a matter of social context.
The gendered sexuality attribution for the masculine woman in example 6 would then be female homosexual, butch lesbian woman when she was recognizable as a woman. When she is taken by others to be a man the gendered sexuality attribution would be gender blending female homosexual, straight man. The gender blending female designation is necessary to explain how it is that both people in this couple can be called homosexual and straight at the same time. Such an attribution, though, could only be made by those who are privy to the fact that a gender misattribution has been made. Those who were unaware that such a mistake had been made would attribute the gender blending female with simply being a male heterosexual straight man.
The final example is that of a masculine woman in a sexual relationship with a still more masculine man. On the surface this relationship seems relatively unproblematic to describe. She is a female heterosexual, straight woman, he is a male heterosexual, straight man. But what of their emphasized masculinity? Hers is sufficiently dominant in her personality that others only rarely attribute her with being a man and never when she is in the company of her still more masculine male partner. Thus it would be an exaggeration to claim that these two people were in a gay men’s relationship, but to ignore that their masculinity is a central feature of their relationship would also be to lose an important nuance of their gendered sexuality.
The solution would be to describe both of them as butch because of their unusual masculinity. She would be a female heterosexual, butch straight woman; he would be a male heterosexual, butch straight man. In this example, the logic of dominant gender schema sexual pairing still prevails in that one is noticeably more masculine than the other. The subtle difference from the norm lies in that these two straight people are involved in a relationship that has strong
homogenderal overtones, i.e., a butch-butch, or masculine “buddy” style of relationship.These examples highlight some of the limitations of the current dominant gender schema’s ability to accurately describe the gendered sexuality of people whose behaviours, desires or fantasies vary from social norms (which, at some time or another, includes most members of society). This is because the ideology of the dominant gender schema makes the splitting of sex, gender, and sexuality conceptually very difficult. Nonetheless, accurate descriptions of the actual gendered sexuality of real people requires these conceptual distinctions to be made. The gendered sexuality of people is rarely static through a lifetime, nor does it always develop in a linear fashion (Cass, 1979, 1983. 1984; Paul, 1984, 1985). The interrelationships of sex, gender, and sexuality make it necessary to have a descriptive system with sufficient subtlety to capture the many combinations of sexes, genders, gender role styles, and gendered sexualities which are possible in any given relationship, at any given time, or in persons’ experiences throughout their lifetimes.
I wish to underscore once again that the classifications generated by this taxonomy are meant to be used in a descriptive fashion only. Relationships, desire, fantasies, roles, identities, attributions, practices and their meanings may be very transitory and multi-layered. It is my intention that this basic taxonomy should break down current limitations and help to open up further possibilities for human self-expression.
CONCLUSION
Current understandings of sex, gender, and sexuality, although sophisticated, still lack sufficient subtlety to adequately account for the full range of present day human sexuality. I have proposed that sex, gender, and sexuality be conceptually treated as distinct, but related, phenomena for the purposes of describing human sexuality. I have further proposed that sexuality would be best captured by a taxonomy of gendered sexuality which incorporates considerations of both sex and gender as they interact in sexuality.While gendered sexuality forms a central feature of the model of gender I have presented, it is imperative to recognize that an accurate description of the real life behaviours of living, breathing people can only be momentarily and simplistically captured by the taxonomy presented here. The conceptual categories and structures I have offered, although perhaps more precise than those that have been previously available, only freeze particular narrow slices of human complexity long enough to examine them. The reality of human gendered sexuality is certainly far more ephemeral, complex, and layered than any amount of words and pictures can describe.
Notes
1. My research generally consists of in-depth interviewing, participant observation, and paper-and-pencil testing with transsexuals, transvestites, gender blenders, lesbians and gay men.2. Throughout this paper I will use pronouns which refer to the gender identities of persons when persons’ genders and sexes are not in normative agreement. I do this on the understanding that transsexual persons change gender and certain physical sex characteristics, and in many cases also legal sex, but not genetic sex. Cross-dressing persons may successfully change their gender on a part-time or full-time basis and may change some of their body morphology but do not change genetic sex. Gender blenders do not attempt to change gender or sex but may have their gender, or sex, misattributed by others.
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