German Klimaklage (Neubauer, et al. v. Germany)

Case name: German Klimaklage (Neubauer, et al. v. Germany)

Jurisdiction: Germany

Type of claim: Claim against federal legislature or government to enact stricter GHG reduction targets / Challenge of specific legislation or policy

Summary of result: Federal Climate Protection Act declared partly unconstitutional. Legislator is obliged to amend the law by end of 2022.

Judgment final: Yes

Court instances:

Court

Type of decision

Summary of decision

Federal Constitutional Court

Judgment of 24 May 2021

1 BvR 2656/18, 1 BvR 288/20, 1 BvR 96/20, 1 BvR 78/20

Sole court instance. Decision on constitutionality of federal legislation.

Court declares federal Climate Protection Act partly unconstitutional and obliges legislator to amend the law by end of 2022.

Source of claims: Constitutional law / Fundamental rights: Violation of Art. 2 para. 2 (Right to life and physical integrity) and Art. 14 para. 1 (property) of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG)

Summary of Judgment

The federal Climate Protection Act

The federal Climate Protection Act (“Klimaschutzgesetz”) was enacted in December 2019. It is the first federal German legislation that comprehensively deals with climate change and greenhouse gas emissions reduction.

The law is based on the commitment of the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to well below 2°C and preferably to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, as well as the commitment made by Germany to pursue the long-term goal of greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050. Pursuant to Sec. 3 para 1 Klimaschutzgesetz, emissions must be gradually reduced by the target year 2030 by at least 55% relative to 1990 levels.

In order to achieve this, Sec. 4 para 1 sentence 3 in conjunction with Annex 2 Klimaschutzgesetz sets out the annual allowable emission amounts for various sectors, such as traffic, energy, industry, and buildings. These sectors will then have to implement concrete reduction measures to meet the targets.

The Act does not contain any concrete emission reduction levels for the time beyond 2030. Rather, Sec. 4 para 6 Klimaschutzgesetz provides that in the year 2025 the federal government must set annually decreasing emission amounts for further periods after the year 2030 by means of ordinances.

According to Sec. 4 para. 3 sentence 2 Klimaschutzgesetz in conjunction with Art. 5 of the European Union’s Climate Protection Regulation,^[1] a certain percentage of annual emission rights may be borrowed from the following year, and unused emission rights from one year may be transferred to subsequent years. Furthermore, unused emission rights may be sold to other European Union member states.

The four constitutional challenges

The Klimaklage actually consists of four separate lawsuits that were brought to the German Federal Constitutional Court between 2018 and 2020. The Court decided to join the cases for the purpose of a unitary trial and decision.

The four lawsuits essentially challenge the emission reduction targets set by the Klimaschutzgesetz as too low. The Plaintiffs argue that the legislator is accepting the risk of dangerous climate change, thereby threatening their rights to life, physical integrity, personal development, property and occupation under the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz – GG).

Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argue that because the targets until the year 2030 are so unambitious, it is to be expected that after the year 2030, reduction efforts will have to drastically increase. Young people will therefore be forced to drastically change their lifestyle and limit their free development in the future. Essentially, current generations are living at the expense of young people and future generations.

The four claims

- The first lawsuit with file number 1 BvR 2656/18 was filed in November 2018 by eleven individuals and two non-governmental organizations (the Association to Support Solar Power and Friends of the Earth Germany). The lawsuit predates the entering into force of the Klimaschutzgesetz.

The initial lawsuit argued that the German state had failed to take sufficient action to combat climate change. The state thereby had failed to protect the Plaintiffs’ rights to life and physical integrity (Art. 2 para. 2 GG) and property (Art. 14 para. 1 GG). Various of the Plaintiffs allegedly suffer from cardiac diseases, circulatory problems and allergies, which would be exacerbated in connection with current and future climate change. Also, various of the Plaintiffs hold property positions which could be affected by the consequences of climate change, such as flooding.^[2]

Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argue that the state had violated their right to an ecological minimum standard of living which can be deducted from a combination of the constitutional right to free development of one’s personality (Art. 2 para 1 GG) and the right to human dignity (Art. 1 para. 1 GG).^[3]

After the Klimaschutzgesetz was passed, the Plaintiffs amended their claim in June 2020. In addition to their initial claim, they argue that the targets set by the Klimaschutzgesetz are not ambitious enough, in particular the overall target set out in Sec. 3 para. 1, the annual emission allowances set out in Sec. 4 para 1 and annex 2, as well as the provisions in Sec. 4 para. 6 concerning updates to the annual emission allowances.^[4]

The two Plaintiffs who are non-governmental organizations furthermore claim a violation of Art. 20a GG, which stipulates that the state shall protect the natural foundations of life and animals, mindful also of its responsibility towards future generations.^[5]

- The second lawsuit with file number 1 BvR 288/20 was filed in 2020 by nine individuals, predominantly youth and young adults. They claim that parts of the Klimaschutzgesetz, especially the emission targets up to the year 2030, are unconstitutional.

The Plaintiffs argue that there is only a limited amount of CO² left which can be emitted before climate change will reach a catastrophic and non-reversible level. If this remaining CO² budget is divided among nations, Germany would be allocated a remaining CO² budget of 3.465 gigatons from 2020 onwards. The Plaintiffs allege that the legislator and government have failed, in violation of their constitutional duties, to take appropriate measures to comply with this remaining budget.^[6]

The Plaintiffs allege a violation of their fundamental right to a decent future, which they derive from the human dignity provision in Art. 1 para. 1 GG in conjunction with the environmental protection provision of Art. 20a GG. It follows from the principle of human dignity that state action or omission must not destroy the basis for self-development and the conditions of existence of future generations. An increase in global temperatures above 1.5°C accepts the risk of loss of millions of human lives and the crossing of tipping points with unforeseeable consequences for the climate system. Taking into account the principle of proportionality, emissions must be kept as low as possible at this point.^[7]

Furthermore, the Plaintiffs allege a violation of an unnamed right derived from Art. 2 para 2 GG (right to life and physical integrity) in conjunction with Art. 20a GG. Several Plaintiffs also allege a violation of their freedom of occupation (Art. 12 para 1 GG) and their property rights (Art. 14 para. 1 GG). Besides, they claim a violation of the respective rights as protected by the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).^[8]

In particular, the Plaintiffs claim that the national reduction target for the year 2030 (55% relative to the 1990 baseline year) is insufficient, and that the annual permissible emission quantities until the year 2030 are too high. If current generations were allowed to continue emitting at such a high level, the remaining CO² budget would be used up within the next few years. This would severely limit options in the future and result in the Plaintiffs having to drastically decrease their emissions, thereby putting their democratic participatory rights, fundamental freedoms and their quality as human beings at risk.^[9]

Finally, the Plaintiffs object to the provision of Sec. 4 para. 3 sentence 2 Klimaschutzgesetz in conjunction with Art. 5 of the EU Climate Protection Regulation because it allows unused national emission rights to be sold to other European Union member states, which levels the effect of increased national climate protection efforts.^[10]

- The third lawsuit with file number 1 BvR 96/20 was filed in 2020 by ten children and youth. Similar to the second lawsuit (file number 1 BvR 288/20), the Plaintiffs claim that parts of the Klimaschutzgesetz are unconstitutional. In addition, they claim that the legislator should have set emission targets for the time beyond 2030, rather than delegating this to the executive.^[11]

- The fourth lawsuit with file number 1 BvR 78/20 was filed in 2020 by fifteen individuals from Bangladesh and Nepal. They submit that their countries of residence are particularly susceptible to the effects of climate change, and that they have personally suffered losses from extreme weather events, flooding or forest fires.^[12] The Plaintiffs allege that, by insufficiently reducing CO² emissions, the German state is violating their rights under Art. 2 para 2 GG (right to life and physical integrity) and Art. 14 para. 1 GG (protection of property).^[13]

The Defendants and the Intervenors

Technically, in a constitutional challenge under German law, there are no defendants. However, the two chambers of parliament, the government, as well as other actors such as political parties or sub-state governments may argue in front of the court that the law in question is in fact constitutional. In this case, the Bundestag (one of the chambers of parliament) as well as the government submitted briefs in defence of the Klimaschutzgesetz. For ease of reference, these will subsequently jointly be referred to as “the Defendants”.

The Defendants argue that, while the state is in principle obliged to protect the people in Germany from the dangers of climate change, the legislature has not exceeded its discretion. The Paris target of limiting global warming to well below 2°C and preferably to 1.5°C is a political decision and not a minimum protection level required by the constitution. Rather, the legislature has at its disposal both measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and measures to adapt to the consequences of climate change. The selection and relative weighting of these instruments are not prescribed by the constitution. Anyhow, the Paris target cannot be achieved by Germany in isolation.^[14]

Furthermore, the Defendants argue that there is no obligation not to exceed a remaining national and population-based CO² budget. This residual budget is a mere calculation which must be discussed, negotiated and decided in democratic processes and that cannot be derived from fundamental rights. While Germany signed on to the position taken in the Paris Agreement, according to which states with very high emissions must reduce their emissions earlier and more decisively, this was a political decision and did not follow from mandatory provisions of the Basic Law. Furthermore, the calculation of the residual budget is subject to considerable uncertainties.^[15]

With regard to lawsuit 1 BvR 78/20, the Defendants argue that protective rights cannot apply to people residing in other countries in the same way as they apply to people residing in Germany, because the German state is not able to effectively protect the former peoples’ rights. There is no direct causal relation between the actions of the German state and the losses suffered by the Plaintiffs.^[16]

The parliamentary group of the Green Party in the Bundestag took the side of the Plaintiffs and argues that the Klimaschutzgesetz and the failure of the legislator and government to take adequate and sufficient measures to combat climate change is unconstitutional.^[17]

The Constitutional Court’s Decision

The Court finds Sec. 3 para. 1 sentence 1 and Sec. 4 para. 1 sentence 3 in conjunction with Annex 2 Klimaschutzgesetz – which set the emission reduction targets for the years up to 2030 – to be partially unconstitutional. These provisions postpone too much of the emission reduction burden to the future, thereby imposing a disproportionate burden on young generations and risking drastic restrictions of their constitutional freedoms.

Interestingly, the Court explicitly notes that the decision was taken unanimous. It appears that the Court wants to emphasize that climate protection is a question of law, and individual judges were not adhering to political views of the respective party they might favour.^[18]

Authority of the German Constitutional Court to hear the case

The German Constitutional Court is competent as first and only instance for judicial challenges of a federal law. Other than the Supreme Courts of the United States, Canada and many other countries, the German Constitutional Court does not act as a court of appeal from lower courts. Rather, its competencies are strictly limited to the interpretation of the Constitution.

Also, different from other jurisdictions, ordinary courts do not have the power to declare a federal law unconstitutional. Rather, if such a question arises in a case before an ordinary court, the court will have to pause the proceedings and ask the Constitutional Court for an opinion on the constitutionality of the law, which is then binding on the lower court.

Individuals may bring a legal challenge directly to the Constitutional Court if they claim that a law violates their constitutional rights.[19] While this requirement may be easy to meet in many cases – if a law directly prohibits the individual from doing something or obliges them to do something – it imposes an additional barrier with regard to environmental laws that do not directly address individuals.

Admissibility

At the admissibility stage, the Court first finds that the claim 1 BvR 2656/18 has become inadmissible insofar as it challenges the complete failure of the legislator to take any action against climate change. This allegation has become void with the passage of the Klimaschutzgesetz.^[20]

Next, the Court finds that a violation of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to life, physical integrity and property due to insufficient reduction targets up to the year 2030 cannot be ruled out.^[21] This includes the Plaintiffs residing in Bangladesh and Nepal, because the constitutional rights are not limited to people residing in Germany, and it cannot be ruled out that these rights require the German state to protect people in other countries from the consequences of climate change.^[22]

The Court further clarifies that the fact that a very large number of people is and will be affected by climate change does not prevent the Plaintiffs from being individually affected in their constitutional rights. German law does not require that the Plaintiffs must be affected in a way which distinguishes them from the public at large.^[23]

The environmental protection provision of Art. 20a GG, on the other hand, does not confer any subjective rights to individuals and can therefore by itself not be the basis for a constitutional challenge.^[24]

The Court further examines whether the two non-governmental organizations have standing to bring a claim “on behalf of the environment”. The Court finds that while it might be beneficial for the environment if such claims were permitted, the Basic Law and the Constitutional Court’s Procedural Code do not grant standing to non-governmental organizations that cannot claim any violation of their own rights. Neither could standing be based on Art. 47 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (Right to an effective remedy and a fair trial), because it was not obvious that only or in particular non-governmental organizations would be able to obtain a remedy in the case at hand.^[25]

Merits

The merits section focuses on the (in)sufficiency of the CO2 reduction targets.

General obligations with regard to climate change

The Court first sets out that it would be unconstitutional for the State to simply accept climate change without trying to limit it.

This follows, on the one hand, from the state’s obligation to protect constitutional rights and freedoms, and on the other hand from the environmental protection provision in Art. 20a GG.^[26]

The state obligation to protect constitutional rights and freedoms

A violation of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights is only conceivable if the legislator and government are under an obligation to protect the Plaintiffs’ rights from being infringed by climate change or natural disasters. After all, the Klimaschutzgesetz prescribes some – albeit arguably insufficient – emissions reductions. In order to find this law unconstitutional for not mandating enough emission reductions, the Court first needs to establish that the legislator is in fact obliged to enact legislation which adequately protects the Plaintiffs from climate change.

This concept – that the state is not only under an obligation not to infringe upon the fundamental rights of people, but to actively protect them from infringement by third parties or natural forces – is known in Germany as the “protective function” (“Schutzfunktion”) of the Basic Law, or as “protective duties” (“Schutzpflichten”) of the state.

According to past jurisprudence by the Constitutional Court, the fundamental right to life and physical integrity, as per Art. 2 para. 2 GG, is not limited to a defence against state interference. Rather, it contains a general state duty to protect life and physical integrity, including from unlawful interference by others.^[27] This duty does not only become engaged once a violation has occurred, but includes taking pre-emptive measures to prevent future violations.^[28] The same holds true for the protection of property according to Art. 14 para. 1 GG.^[29]

The right to life and physical integrity according to Art. 2 para 2 GG, as well as the right to property according to Art. 14 para. 1 GG, encompass protection against impairment from environmental pollution. This also applies to dangers caused by climate change.^[30] Global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions is to a large extend irreversible and it cannot be excluded that during the Plaintiffs’ lifetime, climate change will progress in such a way that their fundamental rights are endangered.^[31]

The constitution therefore obliges the state to protect people from the threats of climate change. The state must take measures which, in international cooperation, contribute to halting global warming. Additionally, the state must take positive adaptation measures to mitigate the consequences of climate change.^[32]

The right to an ecological minimum standard of living

The Court leaves open whether, besides the protection provided by the right to life, physical integrity and property, a constitutional “right to an ecological minimum standard of living” or a “right to a humane future” exists. Since other fundamental rights, such as the right to life, physical integrity and property, already protect against environmental damage “of catastrophic or even apocalyptic proportions”, an additional right is not necessary.

The environmental protection provision of Art. 20a GG

Besides the rights to life, physical integrity and property, the environmental protection provision of Art. 20a GG also prevents the legislator from accepting an unlimited amount of global warming and climate change. Art. 20a GG requires the state to protect the natural foundations of life and animals, mindful also of its responsibility towards future generations.

The legislator has concretised this climate protection goal – in a constitutionally decisive manner – by signing on to the Paris targets of limiting global warming to well below 2°C and preferably to 1.5°C above the pre-industrial level. This temperature threshold corresponds to a national CO2 residual budget. However, the Court finds that it cannot clearly quantify this budget, because various methods for calculation exist.

Once this national CO2 budget – whatever the amount is – has been used up, further CO2 emissions may only be permitted if the interest in doing so outweighs the climate protection requirement of Article 20a GG.^[33]

Application to the Klimaschutzgesetz

The aforementioned is then applied to the Klimaschutzgesetz.

The Court differentiates between two legal questions: First, it asks whether the reduction targets up to the year 2030 are insufficient in a way that they contribute to further climate change, thereby causing a violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights to life, physical integrity and property. Second, the Court analyzes whether the Klimaschutzgesetz violates the rights of the Plaintiffs by shifting too much of the burden of emissions reduction into the future.

No violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights to life, physical integrity and property by setting insufficient reduction targets up to the year 2030

The first question the Court examines is whether the allegedly insufficient reduction targets up to the year 2030 violate the Plaintiffs’ right to life, physical integrity and, in some cases, property. In other words, do the protective duties under Art. 2 para. 2 and Art. 14 para. 1 GG oblige the legislator to enact stricter reduction targets.

The Court answers this question in the negative.

Any suitable climate protection concept, the Court establishes, must pursue the goal of greenhouse gas neutrality, rather than merely reducing emissions. Only climate neutrality can stop global warming.

While the Klimaschutzgesetz only sets an emission reduction target of 55% by 2030, its long-term goal is greenhouse gas neutrality by 2050.^[34] This technique does not appear to be completely inadequate.^[35]

The Court therefore finds that the reduction targets set by the Klimaschutzgesetz are neither obviously unsuitable, completely inadequate, nor do they inevitably lead to a degree of global warming which violates – or at least seriously threatens – the Plaintiffs’ life, health and property.

Details of the Plaintiffs'claims

The Plaintiffs allege that: (a) The climate protection goal of the Paris Agreement (limiting global warming to well below 2°C and preferably to 1.5°C) is already insufficient, but rather it is necessary to limit global warming to 1.5°C maximum; (b) even if the Paris target were sufficient, the reduction measures regulated in the Klimaschutzgesetz are insufficient to meet this goal; and (c) the concrete climate protection measures which the government has taken as of today are not even sufficient to meet the reduction measures regulated in the Klimaschutzgesetz.^[36]

a) After discussing the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Court establishes that limiting global warming to 1.5°C would create a certain margin of safety, especially in the prevention of tipping points.^[37] However, given the considerable uncertainties inherent in the IPCC projection, the legislature currently has considerable leeway in fulfilling its duty to protect fundamental rights, especially since it must also reconcile conflicting interests.^[38] By basing its action on the Paris goal of well below 2°C and preferably 1.5°C, the legislator has not exceeded this leeway.

The Court acknowledges that reducing global warming to 1.5°C may be recommendable from an environmental perspective. However, this is not the same as what is required by fundamental rights. Rather, a lesser degree of protection may be sufficient for the sake of protecting human life and health.^[39] This is especially true since adaptation measures can provide an additional protection for life and health.^[40]

b) The Court notes that there are indications that with the current reduction measures of the Klimaschutzgesetz, it will no longer be possible to meet a 1.5°C goal, and will be extremely hard to meet a 1.75 goal. However, it seems feasible to meet a 2°C reduction goal, which, according to the Paris agreement and the aforementioned, would be sufficient to protect the Plaintiffs’ life and health.^[41]

c) Finally, the Court confirms that the current reduction measures are unlikely to be sufficient to meet the 55% reduction goal of the Klimaschutzgesetz by 2030. However, there is still an opportunity to amend the measures before 2030, which is why no violation of protective duties can be established at this point.^[42]

Shifting the burden of emissions reduction to the future

In a second step, the Court examines whether the Klimaschutzgesetz violates the principle of proportionality by shifting too much of the burden of emissions reduction to the future.

By setting the reduction targets until the year 2030 rather low, and at the same time pursuing the goal of climate neutrality by 2050, it is apparent that much more severe reductions will need to happen after 2030. This means that predominantly young people will bear the burden of these reductions. In order to achieve these, it is likely that the Plaintiffs will face severe restrictions of their fundamental rights and freedoms in the future.^[43]

While the Basic Law continues to protect the Plaintiffs’ rights and freedoms against unreasonable encroachment in the future, the degree of reasonableness is determined by the constitutional requirement to protect the climate. This means: If climate change continues to become worse, more drastic restrictions of fundamental freedoms will be deemed proportionate in the future.^[44]

This chain of events is already foreseeable today and causally linked to the challenged provisions of the Klimaschutzgesetz. It is immanent that a transition to climate neutrality will have to happen in due time. The emission quantities permitted until 2030 have direct consequences for the reduction burden that will be imposed thereafter.^[45] It would be neither responsible nor realistic to initially accept CO2-relevant behaviour and then abruptly demand climate neutrality once the residual budget is used up.^[46]

The Court therefore finds that by setting insufficient reduction targets until 2030, the Klimaschutzgesetz already at the current time violates the Plaintiffs’ future fundamental freedoms.

The Court further holds that inevitable infringement of rights and freedoms in the future will be less drastic if the basis for a climate-neutral lifestyle is already established today. For example, if a CO2-neutral transport infrastructure were established today, the loss of freedom from a ban on CO2-effective traffic, transport and production processes in the future would be considerably less. It will take time before technical progress and other developments allow CO2-intensive processes and products to be largely replaced or avoided. The earlier such transition is initiated, the milder the restrictions on freedoms in the future will be. If, on the other hand, a society has to convert to climate-neutral behaviour in the shortest possible time, the restrictions on freedom are likely to be enormous.^[47]

All the aforementioned considerations are reflected in the principle of proportionality. The Court summarises this as follows:

“The fundamental rights oblige the legislator to design the constitutionally necessary reductions of CO2 emissions up to climate neutrality in accordance with Article 20a GG in a forward-looking manner in such a way that the associated loss of freedom continues to be reasonable despite increasing climate protection requirements, and that the reduction burdens are not distributed one-sidedly over time and between the generations at the expense of the future […]. It follows from the requirement of proportionality that one generation must not be allowed to consume large parts of the CO2 budget under a comparatively mild reduction burden if this would at the same time leave subsequent generations with a radical reduction burden – which the plaintiffs describe as a ‘full brake’ – and expose their lives to serious losses of freedom.”^[48]

If, in view of the manifold uncertainties as to how large the remaining CO2 budget will actually be, it cannot be determined with certainty or ruled out that such serious losses of freedom will occur in the future, precautionary measures may nevertheless be required today that at least reduce the risk.^[49]

Failure to provide a reliably planning horizon past 2030

In conjunction to the aforementioned, the Court further finds that the legislator is obliged to create the necessary conditions and incentives now in order for a gradual development to CO2-free alternatives to take place.^[50] This requires imposing pressure and long-term predictability, also for the time after 2030.^[51]

Sec. 4 para 6 sentence 1 Klimaschutzgesetz currently regulates that the federal government must determine annual emission amounts for years past 2030 by means of an ordinance in the year 2025. This leaves open how far into the future the ordinance must extend. The Court finds that it would at least be necessary for the legislator to determine the time intervals for further commitments in a transparent manner.^[52] Furthermore, postponing the next update of reduction targets until 2025 leaves production, consumption and infrastructure industries without a sufficient planning horizon in order to initiate new developments.^[53]

In addition, the Court holds that the legislator cannot leave such an important issue completely to the government, but needs to determine the annual emission quantities itself, or at least prescribe the essential criteria for doing so.^[54] Particularly because the reduction efforts in the future will have to be considerable and thereby demand serious restrictions of fundamental rights, the legislator will have to create a statutory basis, rather than leaving discretion to the executive.^[55]

The global character of climate change does not oppose the assumption of state duties

The fact that climate change is a global phenomenon which the German state cannot resolve on its own does not invalidate the assumption of protective duties. Rather, Germany must seek a solution to the climate problem at the international level, and contribute to its implementation through national measures.^[56] In the words of the Court, solving the global climate protection problem requires mutual confidence in the willingness of other states to implement the necessary measures at the domestic level.^[57]

Additionally, Germany must counter the dangers posed by climate change through adaptation measures.^[58]

No violation of the environmental protection clause of Art. 20a GG

The Court does not find a separate violation of the environmental protection clause contained in Art. 20a GG.^[59] The norm leaves a considerable margin of discretion, which the legislator has not currently exceeded.^[60]

However, Art. 20a GG confirms the finding above that shifting the burden of emissions reduction to future generations is unconstitutional. Art. 20a GG obliges the state to protect the natural foundations of life, also in responsibility for future generations. This aims first and foremost at preserving the natural foundations of life for future generations. At the same time, this also applies to the distribution of environmental burdens between the generations. It includes treating the natural foundations of life with such care and to leave them to posterity in such a condition that subsequent generations cannot continue to preserve them only at the price of their own radical abstinence.^[61]

[1] Regulation (EU) 2018/842 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013.

[2] Paras. 40-43.

[3] Para. 40.

[4] Para. 39.

[5] Para. 40.

[6] Para. 60.

[7] Paras. 60-61.

[8] Paras. 60, 65-66.

[9] Para. 62.

[10] Para. 60.

[11] Para. 74.

[12] Paras. 79-83.

[13] Para. 84.

[14] Para. 48.

[15] Para. 67.

[16] Paras. 86-89.

[17] Para. 54.

[18] The judges involved in the decision included Chief Justice Harbarth, Christ J. and Radtke J, who had been nominated for their post by the Conservative Party, Britz J, Ott J., and Härtel J. who had been nominated by the Social Democratic Party, Baer J who had been nominated by the Green Party, and Paulus J who had been nominated by the Liberal Party.

[19] Art. 93 para. 4a GG.

[20] Para. 95.

[21] Paras. 96-100. The Court does rule out a violation of the freedom of occupation (Art. 12 para 1 GG).

[22] Para. 101.

[23] Para. 110.

[24] Para. 112.

[25] Paras. 136-37.

[26] Para. 120.

[27] Para. 145.

[28] Para. 146.

[29] Para. 100.

[30] Paras. 99-100.

[31] Para. 108.

[32] Para. 144, 148. Furthermore, the Court affirms that the European Convention on Human Rights also imposes positive obligations on the state to protect against environmental damage that endangers life and health, see para. 147.

[33] Para. 120.

[34] Para. 155-56.

[35] Para. 157.

[36] Para. 158.

[37] Para. 161.

[38] Para. 162.

[39] Para. 163.

[40] Para. 164.

[41] Paras. 166-68.

[42] Paras. 169-70.

[43] Para. 117.

[44] Para. 117.

[45] Paras. 118, 186.

[46] Para. 120.

[47] Paras. 121, 186.

[48] Para. 192.

[49] Paras. 194, 245.

[50] Para. 248.

[51] Para. 249.

[52] Para. 257.

[53] Para. 258.

[54] Paras. 259-261.

[55] Para. 262.

[56] Paras. 149, 199-.

[57] Para. 203.

[58] Para. 150.

[59] Para. 196.

[60] Para. 230-37.

[61] Para. 193.